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The Federalization of Corporate Governance—An
Evolving Process
Marc I. Steinberg*
This Article focuses on the timely subject of the federalization of corporate
governance in the United States from both contemporary and historical
perspectives. Although the states traditionally have overseen the sphere of
corporate governance, federal law today affects the governance of publicly
held corporations to a greater extent than ever before in our nation’s history.
This Article, drawn from the author’s recently published Oxford University
Press book (The Federalization of Corporate Governance), addresses this
timely subject from the commencement of the 20th century to the present.
Through the decades, the federalization of corporate governance has gone
through periods of activism, gradual transition, and stagnation. While the
Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts intensified this federalization
process, it is an overstatement to conclude that these Acts comprise its
foundational components. Rather, these Acts significantly enhanced the
strong presence of federal corporate governance that already prevailed.
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INTRODUCTION
In my recent book, The Federalization of Corporate Governance,
published by Oxford University Press, 1 I explore the process of
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federalization in the United States, commencing in 1903. During that
decade (1903–1914), over twenty bills were introduced in Congress
seeking to mandate federal chartering and/or the promulgation of federal
minimum substantive standards.2 Indeed, both Presidents Roosevelt and
Taft supported the institution of federal chartering.3 In the following two
decades, seven additional bills were introduced that sought to achieve
similar objectives.4 It was not until fifty years thereafter that another
legislative effort was launched—Senator Howard Metzenbaum’s
“Protection of Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980”5—that prescribed
federal minimum standards largely directed at codifying the duties of care
and loyalty of corporate fiduciaries as well as empowering shareholders
to bring suit to enforce the Act’s provisions.6 Nearly four decades
thereafter, we now have our most recent salvo—Senator Elizabeth
Warren’s “Accountable Capitalism Act,”7 which returns to concepts of
yesteryear: mandating federal chartering of relatively large publicly held
enterprises as well as regulating director composition, conduct, stock
trading practices, and specified other matters.8
1. MARC I. STEINBERG, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2018).
2. Id. at 28–70 (describing the bills). See Melvin I. Urofsky, Proposed Federal Incorporation
in the Progressive Era, 26 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 160 (1982). In 1903, the Bureau of Corporations
was established within the Department of Labor. See id. at 169. The Bureau had little enforcement
authority and was subsequently replaced by the Federal Trade Commission with the enactment of
the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914. See Arthur M. Johnson, Theodore Roosevelt and the
Bureau of Corporations, 45 MISS. VALLEY HIST. REV. 571, 575, 589 n.74 (1959).
3. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, UTILITY CORPORATIONS, S. DOC. NO. 92, pt. 69-A, at 18 (1934);
sources set forth in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 28–29.
4. STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 71–77.
5. S. 2567, 96th Cong. (1980) (“A Bill [t]o establish Federal minimum standards relating to
composition of corporate boards, duties of corporate directors, audit and nominating committees,
shareholders’ rights, and for other purposes. . . .”).
6. Id. at 4. Although the bill was not enacted, a hearing was held. See Protection of
Shareholders’ Rights Act of 1980: Hearing on S. 2567 Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of the Comm.
on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 96th Cong. (1980).
7. S. 3348, 115th Cong. (2018).
8. Senator Warren’s bill requires US corporations that have greater than $1 billion in annual
revenues to:
[O]btain a federal charter from a newly formed Office of United States Corporations at
the Department of Commerce [which would obligate] company directors to consider the
interests of all corporate stakeholders—including employees, customers, shareholders,
and the communities in which the company operates. . . [;] [e]mpower[] workers at
United States corporations to elect at least 40% of Board members . . . [;] [r]estrict[] the
sale of company shares by the directors and officers of United States corporations [by]
prohibit[ing][such] directors and officers . . . from selling company shares within five
years of receiving them or within three years of a company stock buyback. . . [;]
[p]rohibit United States corporations from making any political expenditures without the
approval of 75% of its directors and shareholders. . . ; and [p]ermit the federal
government to revoke the charter of a United States corporation if the company has
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All of these bills shared an identical fate: None were enacted.9 That
does not signify, however, that they were futile gestures. Rather, a
number of the provisions in these bills impacted subsequent
developments. Examples include prohibiting corporate insiders from
serving as officers or directors at competing corporations, 10 requiring
independent auditor certification of a subject company’s financial
statements as a condition of issuing a federal charter, 11 and the presence
of federal regulatory mandates impacting executive officer
remuneration.12 The current state of federal corporate governance is due,
at least in part, to the dialogue that was generated by these bills from
decades past. Indeed, to some degree, the Dodd-Frank Act’s13
shareholder say-on-pay advisory vote may trace its origins to a bill
introduced in the midst of the Great Depression that required federal
regulatory approval of officer compensation.14
Hence, the federalization of corporate governance is an evolutionary
process that commenced well over a century ago. As such, it is a
simplification to assert that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200215 and the
engaged in repeated and egregious illegal conduct.
Press Release, Elizabeth Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable Capitalism Act (Aug. 15, 2018),
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-introduces-accountablecapitalism-act. Over 1300 of the New York Stock Exchange’s approximate 2800 listed companies
would be subject to the bill’s provisions. See NYSE Companies, NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/screening/companies-by-industry.aspx?exchange=NYSE&region
=North+America&pagesize=200 (last visited Apr. 1, 2019). Not surprisingly, the bill’s provisions
have been criticized. See, e.g., Tory Newmyer, The Finance 202: Elizabeth Warren Takes on
Corporate Giants as She Lays 2020 Marker, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/the-finance-202/2018/08/16/thefinance-202-elizabeth-warren-takes-on-corporate-giants-as-she-lays-2020-marker/5b746bc91b32
6b7234392946/?noredirect=on&utm_term=ac28b35be8ec.
9. See discussion in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 28–79.
10. With specified exceptions, this prohibition was codified in the Clayton Act of 1914. 15
U.S.C. § 19 (2012).
11. Today, audited financial statements of publicly held companies are required to be contained
in a number of SEC filings, including in the annual Form 10-K report. See, e.g., SEC Form 10-K,
17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2018).
12. Today, extensive disclosure is required of executive officer remuneration. See Regulation
S-K, Item 402, 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2018). In addition, pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act,
shareholders have a non-binding say-on-pay vote with respect to executive compensation. See
§ 14A of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012).
13. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 951 (adding § 14A to the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(1) (2012)). See Shareholder Approval of Executive
Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensation, Securities Act Release No. 9178, Exchange
Act Release No. 63,768, 100 SEC Docket 868 (Jan. 25, 2011).
14. See S. 2847, 71st Cong. § 3 (1930) (requiring that the Federal Trade Commission approve
managing officers’ salaries of subject enterprises).
15. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–66 (2012)).
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Dodd-Frank Act of 201016 are the foundational components in this
process. Rather, these Acts further reinforced federal corporate
governance as a strong presence. These Acts also serve as a poignant
reminder to the states—the principal overseers of corporate
governance—that laxity toward fiduciary conduct may induce the
passage of federal legislation in an effort to remediate state shortcomings,
particularly during times of crisis.17
To illustrate this point, the next Section of the Article explores several
developments at the federal level where corporate governance practices
were embraced in the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era, thereby decreasing state
oversight. Thereafter, examples will be provided that this federalism, at
times, has sought to enhance capital formation and to limit fiduciary
liability while adversely impacting the investing public. Last, the Article
will examine a number of SEC enforcement practices post-Lehman that
merit reexamination.
I. AN EVOLVING PROCESS: THE FEDERALIZATION OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE
With the enactment of the federal securities acts in 1933 and 1934,18
the federal government became the premier overseer of the multifaceted
aspects of securities regulation. Through the years, the passage of
additional federal legislation as well as the adoption of SEC regulatory
measures have impacted the federalization of corporate governance. This
Section provides several examples of this federalization process.
The first example focuses on the federalization of insider trading.
Congress took a key step in this federalization process with the enactment
of Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.19 Going beyond
disclosure, this statute precludes corporate officers and directors from
engaging in short sales of their company’s securities20 and mandates that
such insiders (as well as those beneficial shareholders who own more
than ten percent of a subject equity security) to disgorge their profits
when they purchase and sell (or sell and purchase) such equity security

16. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010).
17. Marc I. Steinberg, The Federalization of Corporate Governance, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 21, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/
2018/06/21/the-federalization-of-corporate-governance/.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq (2012).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
20. Id. § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c). Generally, short-selling is “the sale of a security that the
seller does not own or that the seller owns but does not deliver.” Ralph S. Janvey, Short Selling, 20
SEC. REG. L.J. 270, 271 (1992).
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within a six-month period.21
Subsequently, frustrated with state court reluctance to address suspect
insider trading in the secondary trading markets under traditional
fiduciary duty of loyalty concepts,22 the SEC (Commission) in 1961
handed down its monumental decision in Cady, Roberts & Co.23 There,
the Commission embraced the “access” rationale—namely, that those
persons who, through their profession or other status, have unequal access
to material and nonpublic information must either disclose that
information to the investing public or must abstain from tipping and
trading until such disclosure is made.24 With the Second Circuit’s seminal
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur decision seven years thereafter,25 adhering to
a broad prohibition against insider trading,26 the substantive law of
21. § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (stating in part that the statute’s purpose is “preventing the
unfair use of information which may have been obtained by such [subject] beneficial owner,
director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer”). Suit may be brought by the subject
corporation or an eligible shareholder as specified in the statute. Strict liability applies. See, e.g.,
Whiting v. Dow Chem. Co., 523 F.2d 680, 687 (2d Cir. 1975). Section 16(a) generally requires
persons subject to the statute to report to the Commission and the applicable securities exchange
their holdings in equity securities and their transactions in these securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a).
22. A key item on the SEC Chairman’s agenda was to fill the state law void with respect to
open-market insider trading. Chairman Cary believed that it was “shocking for business executives
to personally profit from their inside information about the corporations they managed [and] that
those actions were likely to reduce public confidence . . . in the markets.” Fair to All People: The
SEC and the Regulation of Insider Trading, In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Company, SEC HIST.
SOC’Y (Nov. 1, 2006), http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/takeCommand_b.php. See
Donald C. Langevoort, Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading
Regulation, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1319, 1320 (1999) (observing that Chairman Cary’s “speeches and
writings during and after his chairmanship at the SEC leave little doubt that he believed that state
corporate law was moribund, perhaps even corrupt”). In this regard, see William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
23. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
24. Id. at 910. The Commission was well aware of the significance of the proceeding, stating:
“This is a case of first impression and one of signal importance in our administration of the Federal
securities acts.” Id. at 907. In that proceeding, the SEC viewed its authority as expansive, asserting
that “the securities acts may be said to have generated a wholly new and far-reaching body of
Federal corporation law.” Id. at 910.
25. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom.
Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In celebration of the 50th anniversary of this seminal decision,
the SMU Law Review has published a Symposium Issue. See Texas Gulf Sulphur 50th Anniversary
Symposium Issue, 71 SMU L. REV. 625 (2018).
26. The Second Circuit in Texas Gulf Sulphur enunciated both a parity of information rule and
an access rule. With respect to the parity of information rationale, the court stated that
anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose it to the
investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a corporate
confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in or recommending
the securities concerned while such information remains undisclosed.
401 F.2d at 848. Focusing on the access approach, the court opined that Section 10(b) sought to
ensure that “all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access to material
information . . . .” Id. Note that many countries with developed securities markets have adopted
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insider trading became federalized.27 Although US Supreme Court
decisions subsequently limited the parameters of the insider trading
proscription,28 these high court decisions reinforced the principle that the
practice of insider trading principally is a matter within the purview of
federal, rather than state, law.29
Another early example of the federalization of corporate governance
is the SEC’s adoption in 1942 of the shareholder proposal rule.30 Clearly,
the conducting of shareholder meetings and items placed on the agenda
for such meetings traditionally have been regulated by state law. 31 This
principle remains vibrant today.32 Nonetheless, since 1942, eligible
shareholders have been entitled under the federal regime to include their
precatory proposals in the subject company’s proxy materials in an effort
to advance social, political, and economic causes. 33 Since its adoption,
either the parity or access approach. See, e.g., Directive 2014/57/EU, of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Criminal Sanctions for Market Abuse, 2014 O.J. (L 173)
Art. III.; Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 1043A (Austl.); Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. 1990, c S-5
s 76(5) (Can.); discussion in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 273.
27. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 123.
28. In Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980), the Supreme Court rejected the parity of
information and access approaches. Rather, such a duty arises where a fiduciary duty or a
relationship of trust and confidence exists. Id. at 230. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642
(1997) (adopting the misappropriation theory premised on a breach of fiduciary duty or relationship
of trust and confidence to the source of the information). In the tipper-tippee context, unlawful
tipping likewise occurs when the tipper conveys the material nonpublic information in breach of
his or her fiduciary duty—normally shown through the knowing receipt by the tipper of a pecuniary
benefit or the knowing conveyance of a gift to the tippee-recipient of the subject information. See
Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). Notably, the
parity of information rule survives in one context under US insider trading law—namely, in the
tender offer setting where SEC Rule 14e-3 adheres to this approach. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3 (2018).
In addition, SEC Regulation FD, with certain exceptions, precludes selective disclosure by
company insiders and intermediaries of material nonpublic information. 17 C.F.R.
§§ 243.100–.103. See generally WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING
(Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed. 2010).
29. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 124–25 (asserting that, “although the Supreme Court has
narrowed the scope of the insider trading prohibition, the legacy of Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf
Sulphur comprises the foundation for the federalization of this important component of corporate
governance”); Roberta S. Karmel, Prosecution of Tippees Affirmed in Salman v. United States, 45
SEC. REG. L.J. 195, 199 (2017) (noting it was “important” that the Supreme Court in Salman
“unanimously approved insider trading prosecutions pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act
and Rule 10b-5 against remote tippees”).
30. Rule 14a-8, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8. See General Rules and Regulations, Solicitation of
Proxies Under the Act, Exchange Act Release No. 3347, 7 Fed. Reg. 10,637, 10,655–56 (Dec. 22,
1942) (explaining the impact of the shareholder proposal rule).
31. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 7.01, 7.02, 7.05, 7.08, 7.25 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016);
Delaware General Corporation Law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 216, 222 (2018).
32. See, e.g., Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971); Superwire.com, Inc.
v. Hampton, 805 A.2d 904 (Del. Ch. 2002); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del.
Ch. 1988).
33. See, e.g., Trinity Wall St. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 792 F.3d 323 (3d Cir. 2015) (submission
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the shareholder proposal rule periodically has been revised.34 As
anticipated, the rule has both ardent supporters35 and fierce critics who
advocate for its repeal.36 Having endured for longer than three quarters
of a century, the rule is not easily dissolved. In this context, the SEC’s
shareholder proposal rule is a vivid example that the federalization of
corporate governance is an evolving process dating back to the early
years of federal securities regulation.
Through the decades, the Commission has sought to impact normative
fiduciary conduct through the guise of disclosure.37 Implementing the
philosophy that revelation of management self-dealing, related party
transactions, and remuneration practices may induce enhanced
substantive standards, the SEC has promulgated disclosure standards
under Regulation S-K.38 To address defective disclosure in this context,
the Commission has brought enforcement actions against subject
fiduciaries. For example, in a 1964 proceeding, the Commission found
that lack of disclosure relating to fiduciary self-dealing in a company’s
registration statement was material to investors, as this information was
of shareholder proposal regarding company’s policy of selling firearms equipped with
high-capacity magazines); Med. Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(submission of shareholder proposal requesting company to cease its manufacturing of napalm used
in Vietnam War), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); Laborers’ Local v. Intersil, 868 F. Supp.
2d 838 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding shareholder say-on-pay vote does not rebut application of
business judgment rule).
34. See SEC Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14 (July 13, 2001), available at
https://www.sec.gov/interps/legal/cfslb14.htm (setting forth the substantive grounds for the
exclusion of shareholder proposals pursuant to Rule 14a-8); Amendments to Rules on Shareholder
Proposals, Exchange Act Release No. 40,018, 67 SEC Docket 373 (May 1, 1998); SEC Requests
Comments on Proxy Rule Revision, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) No. 2836, at 5 (2018) (seeking
comments on whether the SEC’s proxy rules should be revised).
35. See discussion in Virginia J. Harnisch, Rule 14a-8 After Reagan: Does It Protect Social
Responsibility Shareholder Proposals?, 6 J.L. & POL. 415 (1990); Patrick J. Ryan, Rule 14a-8,
Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA. L. REV. 97 (1988); Donald
E. Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69 MICH. L. REV.
419 (1971).
36. See discussion in Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8’s Ordinary Business
Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 705
(2016); Susan W. Liebeler, A Proposal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV.
425 (1984); Alan R. Palmiter, The Shareholder Proposal Rule: A Failed Experiment in Merit
Regulation, 45 ALA. L. REV. 879 (1994). Nonetheless, it may be asserted that, in practical effect,
the shareholder proposal rule “is well entrenched as an accepted facilitator of shareholder activism
and of dialogue between management and institutional shareholders . . . [and] should be recognized
as a vintage asset—a Rule that has symbolized for 75 years that vibrant federal corporate
governance at times is an appropriate vehicle for ameliorating state law shortcomings.” STEINBERG,
supra note 1, at 190.
37. See Ralph C. Ferrara, Richard M. Starr & Marc I. Steinberg, Disclosure of Information
Bearing on Management Integrity and Competency, 76 NW. U.L. Rev. 555 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Items 401, 402, 404 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.401, .402, .404 (2018).
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“germane to an evaluation of the integrity of . . . management.”39
Similarly, in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 1977 decision in
Santa Fe Industries v. Green,40 holding that Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act41 encompasses only deceptive and manipulative
conduct and not “mere” breaches of fiduciary duty,42 the SEC
promulgated Rule 13e-3.43 Through the mechanism of disclosure, that
rule and its implementing provisions seek to impact fiduciary substantive
conduct in the going-private setting44 by mandating that the subject
person disclose whether it reasonably believes that the going-private
transaction is fair or unfair to unaffiliated security holders and the bases
for such belief.45 Defective disclosure in this context may give rise to
both government and private lawsuits.46
On occasion, the SEC has nullified state law. One such example is the
SEC’s adoption of the all-holders rule mandating that tender offers by
publicly held enterprises must be open to all shareholders.47 The
Commission’s action was in response to the Delaware Supreme Court’s
39. Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 172 (1964) (also opining that the “quality” of executive
officers to investors is of “cardinal importance”). See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 796 (2d
Cir. 1979) (stating that “shareholders are entitled to truthful presentation of factual information
‘impugning the honesty, loyalty or competency of directors’ in their dealings with the corporation
to which they owe a fiduciary duty.” (quoting Cohen v. Ayers, 449 F. Supp. 298, 317 (N.D. Ill.
1978), aff’d, 596 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1979))).
40. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
42. 430 U.S. at 477–79. The Court reversed the Second Circuit’s expansive decision that
recognized a Section 10(b) claim without requiring deficiency of disclosure. In that decision, the
Second Circuit opined: “If there is no valid corporate purpose for the merger, then even the most
brazen disclosure of that fact to the minority shareholders in no way mitigates the fraudulent
conduct.” Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283, 1292 (2d Cir. 1976), rev’d, 430 U.S. 462
(1977). See generally Ralph C. Ferrara & Marc I. Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-5
and the New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3. See Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or their
Affiliates, Securities Act Release No. 6100, Exchange Act Release No. 16,075, 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736
(Aug. 8, 1979).
44. See Harold N. Iselin, Note, Regulating Going Private Transactions: SEC Rule 13e-3, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 782, 787 (1980) (asserting that “rule 13e-3 does in effect regulate substantive
fairness through item 8’s requirement that the issuer state its reasonable belief that the transaction
is fair or unfair”). A going-private transaction
[r]efers to a transaction or series of transactions in a publicly held company whereby the
controlling (or other) group substantially reduces or eliminates entirely the number of
shares held by the public by inducing shareholders to exchange their stock for cash,
thereby causing the company to attain privately held status.
MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 486 (7th ed. 2018).
45. See Rule 13e-3(e), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3(e); Schedule 13E-3, item 8, 17 C.F.R. § 13e-100;
Regulation M-A, item 1014, 17 C.F.R. § 229.1014.
46. See, e.g., Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 826 F.2d 1470 (6th Cir. 1987); FSC Corp.,
Exchange Act Release No. 17,892, 22 SEC Docket 1374 (June 25, 1981).
47. See SEC Rules 13e-4, 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4, .14d-10.
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decision in Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co.48 There, the court held that a
target company’s selective tender offer that excluded the hostile bidder
from participating in the offer was an appropriate response by the board
of directors.49 By its promulgation of the all-holders rule, the
Commission, in practical effect, “reversed” the Delaware Supreme
Court’s decision with respect to publicly held companies. In doing so, the
SEC nullified a significant holding by this nation’s preeminent state court
in corporate law matters. The rule thus provides a clear example in the
pre-Sarbanes-Oxley era of the SEC acting proactively to federalize this
area of corporate governance.50
From a historical perspective, for decades, SEC enforcement actions
have impacted corporate governance.51 In several enforcement
proceedings, the Commission successfully has procured far-reaching
orders of ancillary relief mandating that the subject corporation undertake
such fundamental measures as the appointment of independent
directors,52 the retention of independent legal counsel who is tasked with
investigating and reporting regarding specified aspects of the company’s
affairs,53 and the appointment of independent consultants.54 To a
significant degree, the SEC’s use of Undertakings in its enforcement

48. Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
49. Id. at 958 (opining that “there was directorial power to oppose the Mesa tender offer, and to
undertake a selective stock exchange made in good faith and upon a reasonable investigation
pursuant to a clear duty to protect the corporate enterprise”).
50. In the adopting release, the Commission reasoned:
[M]any commentators have asserted that the Commission’s authority under this
provision is limited to regulating disclosure. It is clear, however, that in adopting the
Williams Act, Congress granted to the Commission broad rulemaking authority in
Section 13(e) to determine the most appropriate regulatory scheme for issuer tender
offers . . . [including the] adoption of substantive regulations.
Amendments to Tender Offer Rules—All-Holders and Best-Price, Securities Act Release No.
6653, Exchange Act Release No. 23,421, 1986 WL 703866, at *6 (July 11, 1986). See discussion
in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 140–42.
51. The Commission’s enforcement actions ordinarily are through the consent negotiation
process whereby the subject party agrees to the sanctions levied without admitting or denying the
SEC’s allegations. See William R. McLucas et al., “Neither Admit Nor Deny” Settlements from the
Stanley Sporkin Era: Wise Policy or Outdated Enforcement Notion?, 43 SEC. REG. L.J. 29 (2015).
52. See, e.g., SEC v. Mattel, Inc., [1974–1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
¶ 94,807 (D.D.C. Oct. 1, 1974). A recent example is Tesla’s undertaking to appoint two new
independent directors to its board of directors pursuant to the settlement of an SEC enforcement
action. See Press Release, SEC, Elon Musk Settles SEC Fraud Charges; Tesla Charged with and
Resolves Securities Law Charge (Sept. 29, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2018226 [hereinafter Musk Press Release].
53. See, e.g., SEC v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., [1975–1976 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 95,509 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976).
54. See, e.g., Occidental Petroleum Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 16,950, [1980 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,622 (SEC July 2, 1980).
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actions continues today.55
A vivid historical example of the Commission’s “intrusion” in the
corporate governance area through the use of Undertakings is its 1980
proceeding against Occidental Petroleum Corporation (Oxy). 56 In a
settlement whereby the company did not admit wrongdoing, 57 the SEC
alleged that Oxy failed to disclose several material facts relating to such
matters as
Oxy’s discharge of chemical or toxic wastes . . . into the
environment; . . . the status of Oxy’s negotiations with Libya
concerning the financial arrangement pursuant to which Oxy operated
in Libya; and . . . signed, undated letters of resignation which were
submitted by certain nominees to Oxy’s Board of Directors at the
request of Dr. Armand Hammer, the Chairman of the [Oxy] Board.58

Pursuant to the settlement, Oxy agreed to undertake several significant
corporate governance enhancements, including, for example, designating
a director deemed “satisfactory” by the Commission who was tasked with
the responsibility for: the preparation of an environmental report
recommending procedures to the board of directors to ensure the timely
and accurate disclosure of all mandated information relating to the
company’s environmental matters; reasonably determining the potential
costs which the company would incur within the subsequent three years
in order to make its facilities compliant with applicable government
environmental requirements; and ascertaining the maximum monetary
penalties as well as monetary damages that may be incurred by the
company for such environmental noncompliance.59 The settlement
55. For example, the appointment of independent consultants and monitors occurs today with
some frequency. See, e.g., Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., [2016–2017 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,573 (SEC Jan. 10, 2017) (appointment of independent consultant); SEC v. Avon
Prods., Inc., Civil Action No. 14-CV-9956 (KPF) (S.D.N.Y.), Litigation Release No. 23,159, 110
SEC Docket 2714 (Dec. 17, 2014) (appointment of independent monitor); John J. Huber et al., The
Brave New World of SEC Monitorships, 43 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1480 (2011) (asserting that
“the SEC may increasingly require appointment of a monitor as part of a settlement of an
enforcement action”).
56. Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,622. In
view of its prominence, all seven editions of my Securities Regulation textbook contain this
proceeding. See, e.g., MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 1182–90 (7th ed. 2017).
57. Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,347.
58. Id. at 83,348.
59. Id. at 83,356. Disclosure as to environmental matters, including the costs of compliance,
remains a focus of the SEC disclosure mandates. With respect to climate change, see Commission
Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act Release No. 9106,
Exchange Act Release 61,469, 97 SEC Docket 2414, 2415 (Feb. 2, 2010) (“This release outlines
our views with respect to our existing disclosure requirements as they apply to climate change . . .
[and] is intended to assist companies in satisfying their disclosure obligations under the federal
securities laws and regulations.”).
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provided that the SEC could consult with the subject director and was
entitled to access the materials that were generated in the preparation of
the environmental report.60 The director also was tasked with utilizing
the company’s newly appointed senior environmental official as well as
an independent consulting firm, each of whom was required to be deemed
acceptable to the Commission, to assist in the preparation of the report.61
Regarding the signed, undated letters of resignation from the subject
directors, Oxy was ordered to make requisite disclosure of the change in
its policy.62 Reflecting on this meaningful settlement, I opined in my
recent book:
That a New York Stock Exchange Company in the late 1970s had its
nominees sign undated letters of resignation is surprising and perhaps
shocking. By invoking its authority enforcing the securities laws’
adequacy-of-disclosure mandate, the SEC in Oxy attained a meaningful
measure of remediation with respect to the company’s environmental
practices as well as corporate governance practices. This proceeding as
well as others instituted by the Commission over four decades ago
exemplify the SEC’s impact on enhancing compliance with the law in
areas outside of the securities laws as well as inducing improved
standards of corporate governance.63

A last example focuses on the SEC’s authority to bar subject persons
from serving as an officer or director of any publicly held company. The
Commission’s power to levy this sanction is based on both congressional
legislation and its entitlement to procure ancillary relief in its
enforcement actions.64 The SEC has obtained bar orders in settlements as
well as in litigated proceedings.65 In this context, violation of the
securities acts’ antifraud provisions coupled with a finding of “unfitness”

60. Occidental Petroleum Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 83,357.
61. Id.
62. Id. (providing that Occidental “will make appropriate disclosure of a change in its policy
that neither Oxy nor any officer, director or employee of the company will request or receive any
written or oral agreement, assurance or promise of any kind from any nominee to, or member of,
Oxy’s Board of Directors as it now is or may in the future be constituted”).
63. STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 145.
64. The SEC received statutory authority to procure officer and director bar orders pursuant to
The Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429,
104 Stat. 931 (1990). The Commission obtained this relief in a litigated case as early as 1974. See
SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973–1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,501 (D.
Ariz. Apr. 2, 1974).
65. See, e.g., SEC v. Posner, 16 F.3d 520 (2d Cir. 1994). Recently, pursuant to the settlement
of an SEC enforcement action, Elon Musk agreed to step down as Tesla’s Chairman for at least a
three-year period. See Musk Press Release, supra note 52; Tim Higgins et al., Tesla Braces for
Uncertainty Amid Shift in Elon Musk’s Role, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 30, 2018, 8:02 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/tesla-braces-for-uncertainty-amid-shift-in-musks-role-1538352138.
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are the requisite components for the imposition of a bar order.66 For the
last several decades (since 1974), the Commission has utilized this
enforcement measure to prevent allegedly miscreant fiduciaries from
serving as officers and directors of publicly held companies.67 In this
way, with Congress’s authorization, the officer and director bar sanction
has preempted state corporate governance in a very traditional
area—namely, the appointment and election of directors in a duly
incorporated enterprise pursuant to applicable state governing
principles.68
It also bears emphasis that the national stock exchanges have played
an important role in this federalization process. Over forty years ago, with
the SEC’s “persuasion,” the New York Stock Exchange adopted a rule
mandating that the composition of a listed corporation’s audit committee
must consist solely of independent directors.69 Today, a number of
provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts condition the
eligibility of a subject enterprise to list its shares on a national stock
exchange by mandating that such enterprise comply with the Acts’
requirements.70 Through this process of government directives and SEC
persuasion, the national stock exchanges have advanced the

66. See § 305 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(amending §§ 8A, 20(e) of the Securities Act and §§ 21(d)(2), 21C of the Securities Exchange Act).
Prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the standard was “substantial unfitness” as
enacted pursuant to the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.).
67. See, e.g., SEC v. Bankosky, 716 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2013); SEC v. Jasper, 678 F.3d 1116 (9th
Cir. 2012); SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1995); SEC v. Techni-Culture, Inc., [1973–1974
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 94,501 (D. Ariz. Apr. 2, 1974); sources cited in MARC
I. STEINBERG & RALPH C. FERRARA, SECURITIES PRACTICE: FEDERAL AND STATE ENFORCEMENT
§ 6:18 (2d ed. 2001 & 2018–2019 supp.).
68. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 146–47.
69. See New York Stock Exchange, Inc.: Order Approving Proposed Rules Change, Exchange
Act Release No. 13,346, 1977 WL 173602 (Mar. 9, 1977) (approving NYSE audit committee rule).
In that release, the SEC stated that it “has urged strengthening the independence and vitality of
corporate boards of directors and has suggested that, at least initially, those principles could be
implemented by amending the listing requirements of the NYSE and other self-regulatory
organizations, rather than by direct Commission action.” Id. at *1; see discussion in STEINBERG,
supra note 1, at 241.
70. See, e.g., § 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002; SEC Rule 10A-3, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10A-3
(2018) (stating that “[t]he rules of each national securities exchange registered pursuant to section
6 of the [Securities Exchange] Act must, in accordance with the provisions of this rule, prohibit the
initial or continued listing of any security of an issuer that is not in compliance with the
requirements of . . . this rule [addressing audit committee requirements]”); § 952 of the Dodd-Frank
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900 (2010) (adding § 10C to the Securities Exchange
Act) (mandating that the SEC, by rule, is to direct the national securities exchanges to prohibit the
listing of any equity security of a subject issuer that does not comply with the statute’s requirements
regarding an independent compensation committee).
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federalization of corporate governance.71
When considered from this perspective, the Sarbanes-Oxley and
Dodd-Frank Acts are a continuation of this federalization journey. 72
Focusing on such matters as the presence of independent directors, the
composition, functions, and roles of board committees (including the
audit and compensation committees), the prohibition of company loans
to officers and directors, the shareholder advisory say-on-pay vote, and
the promulgation of corporate codes of conduct,73 these Acts
significantly impact normative fiduciary conduct. These Acts thus
reinforce the strong presence of federal corporate governance. They also
are a poignant reminder to the states that the lax oversight of corporate
fiduciary conduct may portend the enactment of vibrant federal
legislation, particularly during times of crisis.74
II. THE FEDERALIZATION PROCESS ADVERSELY IMPACTING INVESTORS
The federalization of corporate governance typically associates the
enactment of federal legislation and the presence of vibrant SEC
regulation with greater investor protection. The discussion in the
preceding Section of this Article serves to illustrate this principle.75
Nonetheless, during the past few decades, actions taken by Congress, the
US Supreme Court, and the SEC to federalize certain aspects of corporate
governance have been antithetical to investor interests. This Section
provides a number of examples where federalization has adversely
impacted investors.
Commencing in 1980 with the adoption of Rule 506 of Regulation D,76
the SEC slighted US Supreme Court precedent set forth in SEC v. Ralston

71. See discussion in STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 191–262.
72. See supra notes 1–3.
73. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 191–224; Symposium, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 469 (2008);
Symposium, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597 (2007); Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization” to “Mixed
Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721 (2005);
Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The Securities and Exchange
Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79 (2005); Charles W.
Murdock, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act: What Caused the
Financial Crisis and Will Dodd-Frank Prevent Future Crises?, 64 SMU L. REV. 1243 (2011);
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114
YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
74. See Steinberg, supra note 17; Marc I. Steinberg, Curtailing Investor Protection Under the
Securities Laws: Good for the Economy?, 55 SMU L. REV. 347 (2002).
75. See supra notes 19–74 and accompanying text.
76. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,243, 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982).
Rule 506 is an issuer exemption from Securities Act registration of the subject securities.
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Purina Co.77 by equating an individual’s personal wealth with financial
sophistication and access to registration-type information.78 Seeking to
enhance capital formation, the Commission determined that an
individual’s net worth of $1 million creates an irrebuttable presumption
of accredited investor status, signifying that such person has the requisite
financial sophistication and has access to registration-type information.79
As a consequence, no information is required to be provided to the
accredited investor under SEC rules—although some disclosure is made
pursuant to the negotiation process and to comply with the antifraud
provisions.80 Although inflation through the years effectively has diluted
this $1 million level, the SEC has refused to adjust this monetary
amount.81 Indeed, it was not until the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 where
Congress took some action, mandating that the $1 million net worth level
must be exclusive of the value of one’s primary residence.82
Although a majority of the states in the interpretation of their
respective securities laws generally acquiesced in the SEC’s approach,83
a number of states adhered to greater investor safeguards. 84 As a result,

77. SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953). For an example of a lower court decision
after Ralston Purina supporting the proposition that one’s financial wealth does not equate to
financial sophistication, see Doran v. Petroleum Management Corp., 545 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1977).
78. See SEC Rules 501(a), 502(b), 506(b), (c), 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a), .502(b), .506(b), (c).
79. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,243, 11,251 (Mar. 16, 1982).
See Marc I. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Administrative, Enforcement,
and Legislative Programs and Policies—Their Influence on Corporate Internal Affairs, 58 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 173, 209–14 (1982) (criticizing the SEC’s promulgation of Rule 506).
80. See STEINBERG, supra note 56, at 121–38.
81. See Marc I. Steinberg, The “Accredited” Individual Purchaser Under SEC Regulation D:
Time to Up the Ante, 29 SEC. REG. L.J. 93 (2001) (urging the Commission to raise the $1 million
level and pointing out that the $1 million net worth level in 1982 adjusted for inflation represented
a net worth of less than $600,000 in September 2000).
82. See § 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012); Net Worth Standard for
Accredited Investors, Securities Act Release No. 9287, 76 Fed. Reg. 81,787, 81,793 (Dec. 21,
2011). The $1 million net worth level is to be reviewed periodically by the Commission to ascertain
whether this level should be adjusted. See § 413(a) of the Dodd-Frank Act. To date, the SEC has
not raised this $1 million net worth level.
83. See Uniform Limited Offering Exemption (North American Securities Administrators
Association (NASAA), NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 6201 (1983); SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT ON
THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES THAT
ARE NOT “COVERED SECURITIES” (1997), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/uniformy.htm (citing Mark A. Sargent and Hugh H. Makens, ULOE: New Hope, New
Challenge, 45 BUS. LAW. 1319, 1320 n.9 (1990)) (stating that approximately thirty states had
adopted ULOE).
84. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 83; STEINBERG, supra note 44, at 99 (discussing the
position of the Maryland Securities Division in a letter sent by its Commissioner Ellyn L. Brown
to the SEC in May 1988).
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this lack of uniformity was perceived as impairing capital formation.85
Congress responded by enacting the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act of 1996.86 Among other provisions, this Act preempted
the states from regulating offerings that are effected in compliance with
Rule 506 of Regulation D.87 The result of this federal preemption is that
Rule 506 serves as the key issuer exemption from Securities Act
registration and has been largely successful in its mission to enhance
capital formation.88 This success is tempered by the fact that
unsophisticated individuals, who have $1 million in net worth (exclusive
of primary residence), are subject to substantially greater risk of incurring
financial loss.89
Another example focuses on the aftermath of Congress’s enactment of
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA),90 as well
as restrictive US Supreme Court decisions. In 1994, in Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,91 the Court, slighting the
overwhelming view held by the federal appellate courts, 92 held that (in
private actions) Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act93 does not
provide for aider and abettor liability.94 In ascertaining the parameters of
85. See SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 83, at Summary of Findings (stating that “there is still
more to be done to accomplish true uniformity among the states in their regulation of offerings of
securities that are not ‘covered securities’”); Therese H. Maynard, The Uniform Limited Offering
Exemption: How ‘Uniform’ Is ‘Uniform?’—An Evaluation and Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY
L.J. 357 (1987).
86. Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996). See generally Robert G. Bagnall & Kimble
Cannon, The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996: Summary and Discussion, 25
SEC. REG. L.J. 3 (1997).
87. See § 18(b)(4)(F), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(F) (2012). Recently, in promulgating an exemption
pursuant to Tier 2 of Regulation A, the states now are preempted from regulating these offerings.
See SEC Rules 251–263, 17 C.F.R. 230.251–.263 (2018); Amendments for Small and Additional
Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 9741,
Exchange Act Release No. 74,578, 111 SEC Docket 455 (Mar. 25, 2015). The effort by a number
of states to declare this regulation invalid was unsuccessful. See Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646
(D.C. Cir. 2016) (upholding validity of Tier 2 of Regulation A).
88. See Revision of Certain Exemptions From Registration for Transactions Involving Limited
Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,243, 11,251 (Mar. 10, 1988);
Regulation D Revisions, Securities Act Release No. 6758, 40 SEC Docket 449 (Mar. 3, 1988);
Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and
Rule 144A Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 9415, Exchange Act Release No. 69,959, 106
SEC Docket 3343 (July 10, 2013).
89. See sources cited supra notes 79, 81.
90. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995).
91. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
92. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings
in every Circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have concluded that aiders and
abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
94. See Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 173–75 (determining the issue principally based on
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Section 10(b) primary liability, the Supreme Court’s subsequent
decisions have further confined the scope of private liability. 95 With the
passage of the PSLRA, Congress, inter alia, enhanced a subject plaintiff’s
pleading requirements,96 provided an expansive safe harbor for publicly
held companies with respect to their forward-looking statements,97 and
authorized the levying of significant sanctions.98
With the “double-whammy” of the PSLRA and confining US Supreme
Court decisions, plaintiffs in class actions involving publicly held
enterprises increasingly resorted to the state courts.99 Displeased with this
development, Congress responded by enacting the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA).100 With certain exceptions,101
SLUSA requires that class actions under the Securities Exchange Act102
involving nationally traded securities must be brought in federal court
with only federal law applying.103 State securities as well as common law
the language of § 10(b)). For an analysis of Central Bank of Denver, see Marc I. Steinberg, The
Ramifications of Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decisions on Federal and State Securities Regulation,
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 489 (1995).
95. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011) (holding that
under Rule 10b-5(b), primary liability based on material misrepresentation or half-truth may be
imposed only upon those persons who have ultimate authority over the statement’s content and
how it is communicated); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 522 U.S. 148
(2008) (rejecting flexible “scheme” liability framework in private actions under § 10(b)). But see
Lorenzo v. SEC, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019) (holding that persons who knowingly disseminate
materially false statements subject to liability under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)).
96. See § 21D(b) of the Securities Exchange Act; Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
551 U.S. 308 (2007) (interpreting fraud pleading requirements of the PSLRA); Symposium,
Strategies for Investigating and Pleading Securities Fraud Claims, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 525
(2014).
97. See § 27A of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2012); § 21E of the Securities Exchange
Act; Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 604 F.3d 758 (2d Cir. 2010) (interpreting parameters of the
PSLRA safe harbor for forward-looking statements).
98. See § 27(c) of the Securities Act; § 21D of the Securities Exchange Act; City of Livonia
Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Boeing Co., 306 F.R.D. 175 (N.D. Ill. 2014); discussion in MARC I. STEINBERG,
WENDY GERWICK COUTURE, MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN & DANIEL J. MORRISSEY, SECURITIES
LITIGATION—LAW, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 582–83 (2016).
99. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-803, at 14 (1998); STEINBERG, COUTURE, KAUFMAN & MORRISSEY,
supra note 98, at 494 (“After the PSLRA’s enactment, in order to avoid the rigors of federal law,
plaintiffs sought to bring class actions in state courts.”).
100. Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998).
101. The key exceptions are individual actions, derivative suits, and class actions in the merger
and acquisition context (such as going-private transactions, mergers, tender offers, and invocation
of appraisal rights). See § 16(f)(2) of the Securities Act; § 28(f)(3) of the Securities Exchange Act.
102. See Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver Cty. Emps. Ret. Fund, 138 S. Ct. 1061 (2018) (holding that class
actions alleging solely violations of the Securities Act may be brought in state court and are not
subject to removal pursuant to SLUSA).
103. See § 16 of the Securities Act; § 28(f) of the Securities Exchange Act. Nationally traded
securities are those that trade on a national securities exchange. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).

2019]

The Federalization of Corporate Governance

555

claims cannot be brought due to SLUSA preemption.104 The consequence
is that aggrieved investors cannot invoke such attractive claims as those
based on negligence and aider liability.105
This preemption has been particularly problematic with respect to
collateral actors. Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Central Bank
of Denver, attorneys, investment bankers, and consultants were brought
within the private-liability umbrella by means of aider and abettor
claims.106 With the elimination of aider and abettor liability along with
confining decisions construing the scope of primary liability, 107 the
consequence is that collateral actors all too frequently avoid private
liability under the federal securities laws.108 This dilemma is exacerbated
by the enactment of SLUSA which precludes the bringing of meritorious
state claims premised on negligence and aider liability. 109 The
consequence is that for ordinary investors, who cannot afford to opt out
of subject class actions, recompense from these allegedly miscreant
collateral actors will not be forthcoming. SLUSA preemption thereby has
been antithetical to the investor protection objectives of the federal
securities laws.110
III. THE NEED FOR ENHANCED FEDERALIZATION
As set forth in my recent book, three areas merit enhanced
federalization: the undue deference by federal courts to state law, 111 the
need for congressional enactment of a comprehensive statutory
framework prohibiting unlawful insider trading,112 and the application of

104. See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 87.
105. Id. See also Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 571 U.S. 377 (2014) (holding that to have
SLUSA preemption, purchase or sale must be of a “covered” security).
106. See, e.g., SEC v. Wash. Cty. Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218 (6th Cir. 1982); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619
F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980); Stern v. Am. Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
107. See cases cited supra notes 91, 95.
108. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Credit Suisse First Boston (USA), Inc., 482 F.3d 372
(5th Cir. 2007); Ziemba v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194 (11th Cir. 2001); Anixter v.
Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1996); cases cited supra note 95.
109. See discussion supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.
110. See Lisa L. Casey, Shutting the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG. L.J. 141 (1999); Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False
Alarm: Federal Preemption of State Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1
(1998).
111. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 265 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s reliance on state
law standards to interpret federal law, given the federalization of corporate governance that has
occurred, is misplaced”).
112. Id. at 274 (asserting that Congress should “follow the path traversed by other developed
securities markets and enact an insider trading law premised on either the parity of information or
equal access to information approach”).
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federal law to substantive tender offer tactics.113 This Section focuses on
this last subject—the federalization of substantive tender offer
maneuvers.
The legality of offensive and defensive maneuvers undertaken by
bidder and target companies today, for the most part, is assessed pursuant
to state law fiduciary standards.114 Federal law generally focuses on the
process that applies to tender offers115 and, on occasion, forbids the
undertaking of a particular defensive tactic.116 Nonetheless, the
application of the internal affairs doctrine117 signifies that Delaware,
being the state where most major publicly held enterprises elect to
incorporate,118 is the primary determiner in evaluating the legality of
substantive maneuvers in the tender offer setting.119 The consequence is
that Delaware, a state having wonderful beaches and a population of less
than one million residents,120 serves as adjudicator in determining
whether billion-dollar global tender offers will be consummated.121
In a 1985 decision rejecting federal fiduciary standards, the US
Supreme Court held that Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act,122
the Exchange Act’s antifraud provision in the tender offer context, is
concerned with adequacy of disclosure rather than substantive
fairness.123 The Court’s ruling thus signified that the propriety of
takeover maneuvers largely is within state law purview. For the state of
113. Id. at 265–69.
114. See, e.g., Versata Enters., Inc. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586 (Del. 2010); Omnicare, Inc. v.
NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
115. See, e.g., SEC Rules 14d-6, 14d-8, 14d-9, 14d-10, 14d-11, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-6, .14d-8,
.14d-9, .14d-10, .14d-11 (2018); discussion in STEINBERG, supra note 44, at 443–44.
116. See, e.g., SEC Rules 13e-4, 14d-10, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-4, .14d-10 (requiring tender
offers to be open to all shareholders and that the best price paid to any such tendering shareholder
must be paid to any other tendering shareholder); discussion supra notes 47–50 and accompanying
text.
117. The internal affairs doctrine generally signifies that the law where the subject company is
incorporated governs the relations among such company, its directors and officers, and its
stockholders. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 91 (1987).
118. See Cary, supra note 22, at 671; Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts
in the Competition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000); Mark J. Roe,
Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
119. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114; STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 266.
120. See Karl Baker, Delaware Population to Approach 1 Million in 2020, DEL. ONLINE (July
5, 2016, 4:08 PM), http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/2016/07/05/delaware-populationapproach-1-million-2020/86708466/.
121. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 114.
122. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2012).
123. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (“All three species of misconduct
[listed in Section 14(e)], i.e., ‘fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative’ . . . are directed at failures to
disclose.”).
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Delaware (or any state) to determine matters of national policy under the
guise of the internal affairs doctrine is an abdication of the federal
government’s appropriate sphere of authority. To correct this situation,
substantive maneuvers that are undertaken in mergers and acquisitions
(including tender offers) that involve enterprises traded on a national
stock exchange should come within the province of federal law. Congress
should enact legislation to ensure that the federal government, not states
whose economic welfare depends in part on revenues generated from fees
received from enterprises incorporated within their borders, determines
the legitimacy of substantive maneuvers in M&A deals having national
and global magnitude.124
IV. REACTING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS—THE SEC’S NEGLECT TO
INVOKE CONTROL PERSON LIABILITY
In the aftermath of the financial scandals that precipitated the passage
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and the financial crisis that prompted
Congress to enact the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, the Commission
instituted numerous enforcement actions, imposing hundreds of millions,
and even billions, of dollars of money penalties against subject
enterprises.125 Many of these companies are publicly traded, signifying
that innocent shareholders incurred the brunt of these fines.126 Yet, only
on rare occasions did the Commission sue an individual officer or director
of these enterprises.127
What is remarkable is that an express statutory provision exists which
the SEC easily could have utilized and deliberately declined to do
124. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 265–69. For one of the earlier articles that advocated for
federal regulation of substantive maneuvers in tender offers, see Gary G. Lynch & Marc I.
Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901 (1979).
See also Marc I. Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need for Reform, 23 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 1 (1988).
125. See, e.g., Citigroup Alt. Invs. LLC & Citigroup Global Markets LLC, Securities Act
Release No. 9893, Exchange Act Release No. 75,710, 2015 SEC LEXIS 3364 (Aug. 17, 2015);
Deutsche Bank AG, Exchange Act Release No. 75,040, 2015 SEC LEXIS 2145 (May 26, 2015);
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Securities Act Release No. 9992, Exchange Act Release No. 76,694,
2015 SEC LEXIS 5157 (Dec. 18, 2015); Bank of Am. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 72,888,
2014 WL 4101590 (Aug. 21, 2014).
126. See Marc I. Steinberg & Forrest C. Roberts, Laxity at the Gates: The SEC’s Neglect to
Enforce Control Person Liability, 11 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 201 (2017) (stating that “allegedly
blameworthy publicly-traded companies have paid huge monetary penalties—a punishment which
directly harms their innocent shareholders” (footnote omitted)).
127. See, e.g., SEC v. Mozilo, No. CV 09-3994-JFW (MANx), 2010 WL 3656068 (C.D. Cal.
Sept. 16, 2010) (former chief executive officer of Countrywide Financial Corporation); SEC v.
Delphi Corp., 508 F. App’x 527 (6th Cir. 2012) (former chief accounting officer of Delphi
Corporation); SEC v. DHB Indus., Inc., Nos. 0:11-CV-60431-JIC, -60432-WPD, 2011 WL 700536
(S.D. Fla. Feb. 28, 2011) (claims brought against outside directors of company).
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so—namely, the control person provision. Pursuant to Section 20(a) of
the Exchange Act, a control person is equally as liable as the person who
committed the violation unless he or she shows good faith and
noninducement.128 Hence, a chief executive officer, chief financial
officer, chief operating officer, chair of the board of directors, lead
independent director, chair of the audit committee, and/or chair of the
compensation committee, depending on the facts and circumstances, may
be deemed control persons of the subject enterprise.129 Accordingly, a
corporation’s violations of the federal securities laws would subject these
individuals to joint and several liability, with the affirmative defense of
good faith and noninducement being available.130
The control person provision may be viewed as federalizing a
component of a fiduciary’s duty of care and loyalty—namely, the duty of
disclosure.131 When a publicly held corporation engages in deficient
disclosure, those fiduciaries who are deemed control persons are equally
liable unless they establish their affirmative defense under Section 20(a).
The control person statute thus functions as a law compliance
mechanism132—seeking to effectuate lawful conduct while sanctioning
noncompliant fiduciaries who fail to adhere to their disclosure oversight
responsibilities.133
With regularity, plaintiffs in class actions plead Section 20(a) control
person claims against corporate fiduciaries.134 The provision clearly is
available to the SEC;135 yet, the Commission neglected to invoke this
128. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012).
129. See, e.g., Maverick Fund, L.D.C. v. Comverse Tech., Inc., 801 F. Supp. 2d 41 (E.D.N.Y.
2011); In re Tronox, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F. Supp. 2d 202 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Salit v. Stanley Works,
802 F. Supp. 728 (D. Conn. 1992).
130. Accordingly, once a primary violation of a controlled person adequately is alleged,
asserting a Section 20(a) claim is subject to a generally low pleading threshold. See Steinberg &
Roberts, supra note 126, at 215.
131. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998) (stating that Delaware law
“protects shareholders who receive false communications from directors even in the absence of a
request for shareholder action”).
132. Depending on the applicable facts and circumstances, gatekeepers may be control persons.
See, e.g., Rospatch Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,939 (W.D.
Mich. July 8, 1992) (attorney and law firm). Gatekeepers generally encompass attorneys and
accountants who, in a securities law setting, are well situated to detect improper conduct and who
have the ability to withhold their essential services in order to prevent such misconduct from
eventuating or continuing. See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 571 U.S. 429, 448–51 (2014); Fred Zacharias,
Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1389 (2004) (“Lawyers are gatekeepers and
always have been.”).
133. See Steinberg & Roberts, supra note 126, at 207–16.
134. Id. at 238 (citing cases and stating that “within the last three years, cases have been filed
in every single U.S. circuit alleging Section 20(a) control person liability”).
135. Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, Congress reaffirmed that the Commission has
the authority to invoke Section 20(a) in its enforcement actions. See § 929P(c) of the Dodd-Frank
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provision in these times of crisis. The Commission has no explanation for
this failure. One can only speculate. Even with a democratic
administration in power and a former US Attorney (Mary Jo White) as its
chair, one may ask: was the SEC overly concerned with the “noise” that
would have ensued from corporate America if it had invoked this
provision against “upstanding” members of the business community?
Unfortunately, no member of Congress has called upon the SEC to
explain its reluctance—including Senators Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth
Warren.136
Very recently, perhaps due to an article that I coauthored on this
subject137 (at least I can pretend that to be the reason), the SEC resolved
an enforcement action against corporate officers in a publicly held
company premised on control person liability. In SEC v. ITT Educational
Services, Inc.,138 the former chief executive officer and former chief
financial officer of the company entered into a settlement based on their
noncompliance with the control person provision of Section 20(a).139
Whether this proceeding is an aberration or represents the
commencement of the Commission invoking Section 20(a) with vigor is
yet to be determined. What is clear, however, is that the SEC abysmally
failed in its law enforcement obligations by neglecting to utilize the
control person provision to pursue corporate fiduciaries after the financial
scandals two decades ago and the financial crisis a decade ago.140
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1865 (2010) (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (2012)). Prior
to that legislation, the majority of courts that addressed the issue held that the SEC had the authority
to utilize Section 20(a). See, e.g., SEC v. Hawk, No. 03:05-CV-00172-LRH-VPC, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 57414, at *6 (D. Nev. Aug. 3, 2007) (stating that “the majority of courts have concluded
that an SEC enforcement action can be brought pursuant to Section 20(a)”).
136. Although these senators at times have been critical of the Commission, apparently they
have not focused on the SEC’s failure to invoke the control person provision. See infra note 139.
137. See Steinberg & Roberts, supra note 126.
138. SEC v. IIT Educ. Servs., Inc., SEC Litigation Release No. 24,188, 2018 WL 3344233 (S.D.
Ind. July 9, 2018).
139. Id. at *1. Pursuant to settlement, the defendants were enjoined, received a five-year bar
from serving as an officer or director of a publicly held company, the former CEO paid a $200,000
money penalty, and the former CFO paid a $100,000 money penalty. Id. In a letter to SEC Chairman
Clayton, Senators Blumenthal, Brown, Durban, and Warren criticized the Commission for the
“measly fine amounts” that are “nothing more than a parking ticket . . . .” Letter from Senators
Blumenthal, Brown, Durban, & Warren to SEC Chairman Clayton (July 20, 2018), available at
https://www.durbin.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/7.20.18%20ITT%20SEC%20
letter%20FINAL.pdf. While the senators’ criticism has merit, what they perhaps did not realize
was that this proceeding may have represented the first instance in a prolonged period that the SEC
invoked the control person provision against corporate fiduciaries of a publicly traded company.
140. See STEINBERG, supra note 1, at 283 (“For whatever reason, which the Commission has
declined to articulate, it has not utilized [the control person] provision.”); Steinberg & Roberts,
supra note 126, at 206 (asserting that “it is inexplicable why the SEC declines to focus on this
manifestly clear statutory [Section 20(a)] remedy to address the blatant misconduct that transpires
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CONCLUSION
The federalization of corporate governance is an evolutionary process
that began at the beginning of the twentieth century. Through the decades,
this process has gone through periods of gradual transition, activism, and
stagnation. Certainly, the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank Acts have
intensified this process. Today, to the greatest extent in our nation’s
history, federal law plays a central role in the governance of publicly held
corporations. Undoubtedly, this federalization process will serve as a
primary determiner for the continuing stability of the US securities
markets and the quest for meaningful investor protection.

[and that this article] will seek to determine why the SEC has neglected to bring enforcement
actions based on control person liability against executives of Wall Street’s biggest miscreants”).

